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FAILING TO REALIZE NICHOLSON’S 
VISION: HOW NEW YORK’S CHILD 
WELFARE SYSTEM CONTINUES TO 




In June 2010, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) initiated 
child neglect proceedings against an anonymous mother and 
father.1 These proceedings were ostensibly based on two 
allegations: that the father had abused the mother in the presence 
of their three children, and that neither parent was ensuring the 
children’s regular school attendance.2 CPS obtained a court 
order directing that the children be placed in the temporary 
custody of their grandmother, and the court issued a temporary 
order of protection against the father.3 In August 2010, the 
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Children’s Services (“ACS”). However, since this Note also examines child 
neglect cases outside of New York City, for the sake of consistency I will use 
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mother requested a Family Court Act section 1028 hearing4 for 
the return of her son, David.5 The court ordered that David be 
immediately returned to his mother’s custody on the condition 
that she was to cooperate with CPS supervision, enter a 
domestic violence shelter, enforce an order of protection against 
the father, and participate in domestic violence counseling.6 
In compliance with the court’s mandate, the mother moved 
into a domestic violence shelter with David.7 Unfortunately, 
David’s father violated the order of protection by following them 
to the shelter, and they were forced to leave.8 During the 
tumultuous week that followed, the mother violated the court’s 
order by missing one counseling session and by not informing 
CPS that she had left the shelter.9 Indifferent to the 
circumstances surrounding the mother’s brief lapse in 
compliance, CPS placed David in foster care, this time without a 
court order.10  
The next day, the court held a Family Court Act section 
1027 hearing11 to determine whether David was in “imminent 
risk” of danger such as to warrant removal.12 CPS argued that 
David was at risk because “of the possibility that the mother 
might decide to return to the father.”13 Yet, CPS did not offer 
any concrete evidence to support this allegation.14 CPS even 
admitted that before being forced to leave the shelter, the mother 
                                                          
4 See N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 1028(a) (McKinney 2009) (“Upon the 
application of the parent . . . the court shall hold a hearing to determine 
whether the child should be returned . . . .”). 
5 David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d at 894. 
6 Id. at 894–95. 




11 See N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 1027(b)(i) (McKinney 2009) (stating 
that for CPS to remove a child without a court order, such removal must be 
“necessary to avoid imminent risk to the child’s life or health”). 
12 David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d at 895–96. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 896. 
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had been in total compliance with the court’s command.15 
Nevertheless, a CPS caseworker testified that the mother’s 
breach cast doubt on her credibility and demonstrated that she 
could not be trusted to obey court orders.16  
The court ultimately concluded that CPS had not met its 
burden of proof and had contravened the basic precepts of 
Nicholson v. Scoppetta by removing David from his mother’s 
care.17 In Nicholson, the Court of Appeals of New York held 
that victims of domestic violence cannot be found guilty of 
neglect solely because their children have witnessed their 
mothers’ abuse.18 While the David G. court immediately 
returned David to his mother, it did not dismiss the neglect 
proceeding.19 Moreover, David was only paroled to his mother 
on the condition that she was to cooperate with CPS supervision 
and referrals for domestic violence services while the neglect 
case was ongoing.20 
The case of David G. is troublesome for a number of 
reasons. First, CPS’s primary basis for depriving the mother of 
custody appears to be her children’s exposure to the abuse she 
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 901; see also Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 853 
(N.Y. 2004) (“[E]mergency removal is appropriate where the danger is so 
immediate, so urgent that the child’s life or safety will be at risk before an ex 
parte order can be obtained. The standard obviously is a stringent one.”); see 
also infra Part III (discussing the impact of Nicholson on child neglect 
proceedings against battered mothers in New York). 
18 Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844. Throughout this Note, I refer to 
domestic violence victims as women and batterers as men for the sake of 
consistency and to reflect the fact that the overwhelming majority of domestic 
violence victims are indeed women. See Domestic Violence Facts, NAT’L 
COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (July 2007), http://www.ncadv.org/ 
files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf (stating that 85% of domestic 
violence victims are women); Intimate Partner Violence in the U.S., BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/intimate/victims.cfm 
(last modified Apr. 4, 2012) (stating that between 1976 and 2005, intimate 
partners committed 30% of homicides against females versus 5% of males). 
19 David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d at 901. 
20 Id. 
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suffered at the hands of their father.21 While CPS also accused 
the mother of failing to ensure that her children regularly 
attended school, the court opinion does not articulate any 
support for that allegation.22 Furthermore, the mother is only 
ordered to comply with domestic violence services.23 Second, the 
father’s violation of the order of protection was the impetus 
behind CPS placing David in foster care, despite the mother’s 
best efforts to keep her and David safe.24 The caseworker who 
testified focused narrowly on the mother’s lapse in compliance, 
and did not consider that the mother fled the domestic violence 
shelter—which she had entered at the court’s direction—in order 
to avoid further abuse.25 Finally, it is unclear on what grounds 
the family court kept the neglect proceeding open, because it did 
not elaborate on its additional reasons for suspecting her of 
neglect, as required by Nicholson.26 Thus, despite having 
admonished CPS for violating Nicholson by removing David, the 
court seemingly continued the neglect case against the mother 
primarily because she was a victim of domestic violence.27 
This Note argues that CPS agencies in New York contradict 
the policy goals of Nicholson when they remove children from 
their nonviolent parents chiefly due to the children’s exposure to 
domestic violence, despite the presence of other, usually minor 
charges. In addition, this Note contends that, under Nicholson, 
family courts should dismiss these neglect proceedings if they 
cannot articulate a separate, credible ground for suspecting the 
mother of neglect. Part II of this Note describes the path of a 
CPS case in New York, exploring the various ways it can travel 
through the family court system. Part III discusses the landmark 
Nicholson case and why charging battered mothers with neglect 
is problematic. It also considers the role class and gender may 
play in the child welfare system and analyzes the current flaws 
                                                          
21 Id. at 894. 
22 See id. 
23 Id. at 901. 
24 Id. at 895. 
25 Id. at 896. 
26 See David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d. 891. 
27 See id. 
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in CPS practice. Part IV examines court decisions post-
Nicholson which suggest that its vision has yet to be realized and 
argues that in order to more effectively further the goals of 
Nicholson, family courts must clearly delineate their 
consideration of the Nicholson factors in neglect proceedings 
against battered mothers. Finally, Part V proposes holistic 
solutions for change that will require the cooperation of CPS and 
New York family courts, as well as increased community 
support for families affected by domestic violence. 
II. THE PATH OF CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT CASES IN 
NEW YORK STATE 
CPS cases begin when someone calls a report of suspected 
child abuse or neglect to a hotline operated by the New York 
State Central Register of Child Abuse or Maltreatment 
(“SCR”).28 If the SCR finds sufficient cause to suspect abuse or 
neglect, they will send the report to the local child protection 
agency.29 Next, a caseworker will have twenty-four hours to 
initiate and sixty days to complete an investigation to determine 
the accuracy of the report.30 During the investigation, the 
caseworker will assess the condition of the child’s home and 
interview the child’s parents and any other person with 
potentially vital information concerning the child’s well-being.31 
At the end of the investigation the caseworker will either declare 
the report to be “unfounded” or “indicated” (i.e. accurate).32 
                                                          
28 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 422(1), 422-a (McKinney 2010); N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432 (2012); see also INMOTION & 
BROOKLYN BAR ASS’N VOLUNTEER LAWYERS PROJECT, ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
CASES IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (2002) [hereinafter ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
CASES], available at http://www.inmotiononline.org/assets/pdfs/TheBasics 
Series_English/Abuse_and_Neglect.pdf. 
29 SOC. SERV. §§ 415, 422.2(b); COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 
432.2(b)(2); see also ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, supra note 28, at 5. 
30 COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 432.2(b)(3), 432.3(k); see also 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, supra note 28, at 6. 
31
 COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 432.2(b)(3), 432.3(k); see also 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, supra note 28, at 6. 
32 COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432.2(b)(3)(iv); see also ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT CASES, supra note 28, at 6. 
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When a report is indicated, CPS may bring child protective 
proceedings against the parents by filing a petition under Article 
10 of the Family Court Act.33 CPS may either commence such 
proceedings while the investigation is pending, or if the report is 
deemed indicated, after the investigation is complete.34 Shortly 
thereafter, the court must hold a preliminary hearing to evaluate 
whether the child’s interests should be protected while the final 
order of disposition is pending.35 CPS has the burden of proving 
that removal is necessary “to avoid imminent risk to the child’s 
life or health.”36 The court must consider whether CPS made 
reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removal and whether 
removing the offending parent from the child’s home via an 
order of protection would lessen the risk to the child.37 
There are other avenues available to CPS and the family 
courts if there is not enough time to file a petition and hold a 
preliminary hearing.38 For instance, the court may issue an order 
of removal at an expedited preliminary hearing.39 However, if 
CPS determines that the child is in such immediate danger that 
there is not enough time for the expedited preliminary hearing, 
it may remove a child from its parents without a court order.40 
When CPS conducts an emergency removal without a court 
order, the child’s parents may apply for a Family Court Act 
section 1028 hearing to secure their child’s return.41 This hearing 
                                                          
33 N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 1032(a) (McKinney 2011).  
34 See JUD. CT. ACTS § 1032(a); SOC. SERV. §§ 397(2)(b), 424(11); see 
also, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
35 JUD. CT. ACTS § 1027(a); see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d 
at 167. 
36 JUD. CT. ACTS § 1027(b)(i); see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 
2d at 167. 
37 JUD. CT. ACTS § 1027(b); see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d 
at 167. 
38 JUD. CT. ACTS § 1022; see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 
167. 
39 JUD. CT. ACTS § 1022; see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 
167. 
40 JUD. CT. ACTS §§ 1022, 1024; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 417 
(McKinney 2010); see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 167. 
41 JUD. CT. ACTS § 1028; see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 
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must take place within three days of the parents’ application.42 
At this hearing, the court may decide to “parole” the child to his 
or her parents while the proceeding continues.43 The child is then 
released into the temporary custody of his or her parents, 
although usually with broad oversight by CPS.44 
After the preliminary issues have been resolved, the next 
step in the court proceedings is the fact-finding stage.45 This is 
generally a long and arduous process.46 Nicholas Scoppetta, the 
previous Commissioner of New York City’s Administration for 
Children’s Services has stated, “Once you are in the Family 
Court, you are in it very often for many months before you can 
get to the substance of the case . . . .”47 Therefore, child 
protective caseworkers play a crucial gate-keeping role in 
ensuring that the only cases entering the family court system are 
the ones that belong there. 
III. NICHOLSON’S ATTEMPT TO DECOUPLE DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE AND NEGLECT  
New York State’s definition of neglect has undergone a 
significant evolution in recent years. Section 1012 of the Family 
Court Act defines a neglected child as one “whose physical, 
mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in 
imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure 
of his parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care.”48 For 
years, courts could find battered mothers to be neglectful based 
on their perceived failure to protect their children from exposure 
to domestic violence.49 In fact, CPS could remove children from 
                                                          
168. 
42 JUD. CT. ACTS § 1028; see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 
168. 





48 N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 1012(f)(i) (McKinney 2009). 
49 See The “Failure to Protect” Working Grp., Charging Battered 
Mothers with “Failure to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM 
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their mother’s custody in cases where the only allegation was 
that the mother herself had been abused.50  
The landmark Nicholson decision dramatically changed the 
definition of neglect in New York by holding that battered 
mothers could not be found neglectful solely because their 
children were exposed to domestic violence.51 The Nicholson 
court determined that removing children from their nonviolent 
parents unfairly punishes battered mothers52 and, when it comes 
to the child’s welfare, may in fact do more harm than good.53 
This decision was an important first step for New York in 
moving away from a child welfare system that often blamed 
victims for their abuse instead of holding batterers accountable. 
In order to comply with Nicholson, local CPS agencies must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child’s 
“physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or 
is in imminent danger of becoming impaired” and that this is 
“clearly attributable” to the mother’s failure to exercise a 
“minimum degree of care” toward the child.54 The court 
emphasized that the statute merely required a “‘baseline minimal 
degree of care’—not maximum, not best, not ideal—and the 
failure must be actual, not threatened.”55 It is important to note 
that this “minimal degree of care” is a very low bar.56 
Furthermore, in determining whether a parent has met this 
nominal standard of care, courts must objectively consider 
                                                          
URB. L.J. 849, 849–54 (2000); see also G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable 
Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the Battered 
Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 107–
08 (1999). 
50 See Miccio, supra note 49, at 92 (citing In re Theresa, 576 N.Y.S.2d 
937 (App. Div. 1991)); see also In re Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464, 470 
(Fam. Ct. 1992) (holding that neglect is a strict liability offense). 
51 Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 853 (N.Y. 2004) (“Plainly, 
more is required for a showing of neglect under New York law than the fact 
that a child was exposed to domestic abuse against the caretaker.”). 
52 See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002).  
53 Id. at 204. 
54 Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 845–46. 
55 Id. at 846 (citing In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979)). 
56 Id. 
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whether “a reasonable and prudent parent would have so acted, 
or failed to act, under the circumstances then and there 
existing.”57  
When judging whether a battered mother has acted 
reasonably under the circumstances, courts must consider the  
risks attendant to leaving, if the batterer has threatened to 
kill her if she does; risks attendant to staying and 
suffering continued abuse; risks attendant to seeking 
assistance through government channels, potentially 
increasing the danger to herself and her children; risks 
attendant to criminal prosecution against the abuser; and 
risks attendant to relocation.58  
Furthermore, the determination of whether a battered mother has 
failed to exercise the requisite basic level of care “is necessarily 
dependent on facts such as the severity and frequency of the 
violence, and the resources and options available to her.”59  
Additionally, each case must be individually assessed to 
determine “whether the imminent risk to the child can be 
mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal. [The court] 
must balance that risk against the harm removal might 
bring . . . .”60 In addition, the court must evaluate whether the 
need for removal could be eradicated by offering the mother and 
child preventive services.61 Thus, after Nicholson, CPS 
caseworkers may no longer charge battered mothers with neglect 
solely because their child was exposed to domestic violence.62  
                                                          
57 Id. (citing In re Jessica YY., 685 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491 (App. Div. 
1999)). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (citing In re Melissa U., 538 N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div. 1989)).  
60 Id. at 852. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 844. However, the court cautioned that a battered mother could 
still properly be charged with neglect where “a preponderance of the 
evidence establishes that the children were actually or imminently harmed by 
reason of her failure to exercise even minimal care in providing them with 
proper oversight.” Id. at 847. The court offers several examples where 
additional factors are present other than the children’s mere exposure to the 
domestic violence. Id. 
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A. Charging Battered Mothers with Neglect is Problematic 
An overview of the complexities underlying domestic 
violence is helpful to understanding the importance of 
Nicholson’s vision that battered mothers should not be blamed 
for the abuse they have endured.63 Various theories have been 
propounded to explain the psychological effects of domestic 
violence on battered women.64 The New York State Office for 
the Prevention of Domestic Violence (“OPDV”) defines 
domestic violence as a pattern of verbal, psychological, and/or 
physical abuse by one person in order to control the other 
person in an intimate relationship.65 Abuse, therefore, need not 
be physical in order to have an impact.66  
Before the inception of the Battered Women’s Movement in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, domestic violence was 
considered a private family matter and therefore 
“noncriminal.”67 Police officers responding to domestic violence 
calls would often “tell the husband to ‘cool off’ by ‘taking a 
walk around the block.’”68 The Battered Women’s Movement 
shed light on the severity of domestic violence and developed 
community resources to assist battered women.69 Today, the 
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office describes domestic violence 
as “a public health crisis that affects us all.”70 In 2010, New 
York City police responded to 249,440 domestic violence 
                                                          
63 See generally Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d 840. 
64 See generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT 
OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 117–20 (2007) [hereinafter STARK, COERCIVE 
CONTROL]. 
65 See Domestic Violence: Finding Safety and Support—Understanding 
the Problem, N.Y.S. OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/help/fss/theproblem.html#whatisdv (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2012). 
66 See id. 
67 Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the 
Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1662. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1666. 
70 Domestic Violence, N.Y. CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
http://manhattanda.org/hot-topic (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
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incidents, which translates to about 680 incidents per day.71 
Moreover, New York State’s OPDV estimates that intimate 
partner violence accounts for 3% of all violence against males 
and 23% of all violence against females in the United States.72  
Dr. Lenore Walker, a clinical and forensic psychologist, 
developed the “Cycle Theory of Violence” in an effort to 
explain the complex interpersonal dynamics of an abusive 
relationship.73 According to this theory, a recurring battering 
cycle is composed of three phases.74 The first phase is 
characterized by “a gradual escalation of tension” through the 
batterer’s verbal or physical abuse of his partner.75 During this 
phase, the woman learns to walk on eggshells to avoid angering 
her abuser.76 She tries her best to pacify him, but her inability to 
predict his responses leads to the creation of “learned 
helplessness.”77 Dr. Walker defines “learned helplessness” as 
“having lost the ability to predict that what you do will make a 
particular outcome occur,” and argues that because such coping 
behavior is learned, it can also be unlearned.78 The second phase 
occurs after the batterer has created such an atmosphere of 
tension that an explosion of physical violence is inescapable 
without intervention.79 Finally, in the third phase, the batterer 
may express remorse for his physical violence and promise to 
never do it again.80 He may be loving and attentive, reminding 
                                                          
71 Domestic Violence Annual Fact Sheet 2010, N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFFICE 
TO COMBAT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ocdv/ 
downloads/pdf/2010_annual_DVFactSheet .pdf (2010). The City’s Domestic 
Violence Hotline also took 119,177 calls, an average daily total of more than 
320. Id. 
72 National Intimate Partner Violence Statistics, N.Y.S. OFFICE FOR THE 
PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/statistics/ 
nationaldvdata/natlipvstats.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).  
73 See generally LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 
SYNDROME 126–38 (2d ed. 2000). 




78 Id. at 116. 
79 Id. at 126–27. 
80 Id. at 127. 
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the woman of why she fell in love with him.81 Even if the 
batterer does not express any remorse, the absence of violence 
and tension alone may reinforce the battered woman’s belief that 
her partner’s violent behavior was an aberration.82 
The theory of “traumatic bonding,” developed by 
sociologists Donald Dutton and Susan Painter, provides 
additional insight into the dynamics of an abusive relationship.83 
It refers to “the development and course of strong emotional ties 
between two persons where one person intermittently harasses, 
beats, threatens, abuses or intimidates the other.”84 According to 
traumatic bonding theory, abusive relationships are characterized 
by a mutually dependent power imbalance and intermittent 
abusive episodes.85 The woman views the first violent incident as 
an aberration; she does not believe her partner will hurt her 
again.86 As the abuse become more frequent and severe, the 
woman comes to believe that it is her fault and that it is within 
her power to prevent it from happening again.87 By the time the 
woman realizes that she cannot control the abuse, the 
relationship’s power imbalance has intensified; she feels 
dependent on her batterer, and her batterer in turn needs her to 
maintain his sense of dominance.88  
Furthermore, many actions taken by a battered mother may 
be the result of rational, reasoned choices as to what will best 
protect her and her children.89 For example, an abused woman 
                                                          
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 126. 
83 Don Dutton & Susan Lee Painter, Traumatic Bonding: The Development 
of Emotional Attachments in Battered Women and Other Relationships of 
Intermittent Abuse, 6 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT’L J. 139, 139 (1983). 
84 Id. at 146–47. 
85 Id. at 147–48. 
86 Id. at 151. 
87 Id. 
88 Donald G. Dutton & Susan Painter, Emotional Attachments in Abusive 
Relationships: A Test of Traumatic Bonding Theory, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 
105, 106–07 (1993). 
89 Amy R. Melner, Rights of Abused Mothers vs. Best Interest of Abused 
Children: Courts’ Termination of Battered Women’s Parental Rights Due to 
Failure to Protect Their Children From Abuse, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 299, 309 (1998). 
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may reasonably believe that she will be in more danger if she 
leaves the relationship than if she stays.90 Indeed, this is often 
accurate, as a battered woman is at a higher risk of severe or 
fatal injury after leaving her abuser.91 In addition, lack of 
financial resources, social support, an inadequate number of 
domestic violence shelters, and fear of losing her children may 
cause a battered woman to rationally decide that it will be better 
for her and her children if she stays in the relationship.92  
Moreover, in order to properly ascertain the impact domestic 
violence has on a battered woman, the abuse should be viewed 
as an ongoing, continuous event.93 Even when there is a lull in 
the physical violence, an abused woman lives with the fear and 
certainty that such violence could erupt at any moment.94 Her 
fear is derived not just from the immediate threat her batterer is 
presenting, but also from what she knows he is capable of.95 
While courts and caseworkers may assume that the 
psychological manifestations of abuse are fundamental to the 
character of battered mothers, such symptoms generally 
disappear after the abusive relationship is over.96 While some 
battered women may continue to enter into violent relationships, 
the reality is that many do not.97 In fact, Dr. Walker’s research 
into the behavior of domestic violence victims discovered that 
when beginning new relationships, “[battered women] were 
extremely careful not to choose another violent [man].”98  
While she is in the grip of an abusive relationship, however, 
a battered woman may feel as though she cannot escape.99 This 
psychological response should be attributed to “the nature of the 
relationship, not the nature of the woman.”100 Behavior that may 
                                                          
90 Id. at 309–10. 
91 STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 64, at 115.  
92 Melner, supra note 89, at 308–15. 
93 Id. at 305. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 Id. at 309. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (quoting LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 28 (1979)). 
99 Id. at 308. 
100 Id.  
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seem irrational to an outsider could instead be “a terrified human 
being’s normal response to an abnormal and dangerous 
situation.”101 A batterer creates a “generalized feeling of 
powerlessness” in his victim.102 He may force her to choose 
between her own safety and the safety of her children, or threaten 
to hurt her if she reports his violence to the authorities.103 Thus, 
courts should not assume that the actions a battered woman takes 
while she is in an abusive relationship are evidence of her true 
character.104 
In addition, it is important to view domestic violence within 
the broader framework of societal gender inequality.105 Narrowly 
focusing on the individual correlates of intimate partner violence 
ignores the fact that partner abuse does not occur in a vacuum; 
rather, it is “a chosen behavior occurring in a larger structural 
context.”106 Susan Schechter, a leading feminist scholar, argues 
that domestic violence should be viewed as a collective problem 
caused by women’s oppression, rather than as one of individual 
victimization.107 Similarly, Dr. Stark, a nationally recognized 
expert on domestic violence and an expert witness for the 
plaintiffs in Nicholson, argues that while trauma theory is 
helpful to explain why many battered women fail to effectively 
utilize support services, it is also dangerous because it shifts the 
focus from the batterer’s actions to the victim’s response, which 
may reinforce the stereotype that victims of domestic violence 
are at least partially to blame for their abuse.108  
                                                          
101 Id. (quoting LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED 
WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 180 (1990)). 
102 Geneva Brown, When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis—An 
Affirmative Defense for Battered Mothers, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 189, 
214 (2005). 
103 Evan Stark, Nicholson v. Williams Revisited: When Good People Do 
Bad Things, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 691, 715 (2005) [hereinafter, Stark, Good 
People]. 
104 See generally id. at 713–16. 
105 LARRY L. TIFFT, BATTERING OF WOMEN: THE FAILURE OF 
INTERVENTION AND THE CASE FOR PREVENTION 16 (1993). 
106 Id. at 13. 
107 See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 252 (1982).  
108 STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 64, at 116–17. 
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This shift in accountability is amplified by the fact that child 
protective workers are often encouraged, and indeed may find it 
easier, to deal with the nonviolent parent.109 Professor Leigh 
Goodmark, of the University of Baltimore School of Law, 
suggests that “this reluctance may stem from fear of the 
perpetrator, the difficulty of tracking the perpetrator down, lack 
of appropriate services to offer batterers, or the absence of a 
familial relationship between the perpetrator and the child.”110 
However, basing a neglect charge against a battered woman on 
her abusive partner’s actions only furthers the power imbalance 
of the relationship; the court sends her the message that she is a 
“bad mother” and that she is at least partly to blame for what 
has transpired.111 Yet, in families affected by domestic violence, 
both mother and child are victims at the offender’s hands.112 
Therefore, it is imperative that CPS and family courts do not 
punish battered mothers for being abused. Family courts in 
particular must take care to ensure that CPS has an alternative 
basis for any neglect charges it may bring against battered 
women. 
B. Role of Class and Gender in the System’s Treatment of 
Battered Mothers 
Some suggest that there are two separate child welfare 
systems: one for families that are poor, and one for families that 
are not.113 Whereas the custody battles of upper-class families are 
                                                          
109 Leigh Goodmark, Achieving Batterer Accountability in the Child 
Protection System, 93 KY. L.J. 613, 620 (2004) (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF PUB. 
CHILD WELFARE ADM’RS, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE 
AGENCIES SERVING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES EXPERIENCING DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 10 (2001)). 
110 Id. at 620. 
111 See Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The 
Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 
565, 588 (2004) (“The system and the batterer have the same refrain towards 
the mother: it—whatever ‘it’ is—is her fault.”). 
112 See Stark, Good People, supra note 103, at 715–16.  
113 DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD 
WELFARE 26 (2002). 
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largely dealt with in private divorce actions, the problems of 
low-income families are usually relegated to public child 
protective agencies, such as CPS.114 This is illustrated by the 
disparity in treatment of private custody and visitation disputes 
in Supreme Court, where access is largely limited to families 
who can afford private counsel, and actions brought in family 
courts, which are overwhelmingly against or on behalf of low-
income persons.115 The stark contrast between the legal system’s 
treatment of affluent and indigent children has existed in 
America since the inception of the child welfare movement, and 
continues today.116 
Domestic violence cases that would ordinarily result in a 
report of neglect if handled by CPS may not have the same 
result when they arise in the context of a private civil action. 
For instance, in J.R v. N.R., a father filed a petition in 
Richmond County Supreme Court seeking visitation with his 
seventeen-year-old daughter, Nicole.117 The mother alleged that 
she had been physically, sexually, and emotionally abused by 
her husband throughout their marriage.118 She also testified that 
her husband had physically abused Nicole on more than one 
occasion.119 In one such incident the father kicked Nicole and 
broke her finger.120 When the mother took Nicole to the doctor, 
however, she lied about the source of Nicole’s injuries and 
directed Nicole to do the same because she was scared that 
Nicole would be placed in foster care if she told the truth.121 The 
                                                          
114 Id. 
115 Irene Jay Liu, Report: Family Courts in Crisis, TIMES UNION (Oct. 
25, 2009), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Report-family-courts-in-
crisis-557888.php#page-2 (quoting Caroline Kearney, Family Law 
Coordinator at Legal Services NYC, stating “[T]he family courts are by and 
large poor people’s courts[;] . . . the litigants . . . are disproportionately 
poor people of color.”).  
116 See ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 26–27. 
117 J.R. v. N.R., No. V-00064/08-08A, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2383, 
at *1, *6 (Sup. Ct. May 18, 2011). 
118 Id. at *8–9.  
119 Id. at *10–13, *16. 
120 Id. at *12–13. 
121 Id. 
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court stated that, while it “obviously does not condone Mother’s 
failure to tell the truth about how Nicole’s finger was injured, 
[it] does credit Mother’s testimony that Father told her that her 
children might well be removed if another incident was 
reported.”122 In 2003, the father was excluded from the home via 
an order of protection after the mother came home from work to 
find that her husband had beat Nicole “black and blue” for 
“telling on him.”123 Yet, the J.R. court does not mention the 
mother ever being investigated for neglect, despite her testimony 
that her husband had been physically abusive towards her and 
the children throughout their approximately sixteen year 
marriage.124 
On the contrary, parties in family court do not seem to 
receive such sympathetic treatment. For example, in David G., 
the family court did not dismiss a neglect proceeding against a 
mother whose only potentially viable offense was not ensuring 
her children’s regular school attendance.125 Moreover, in In re 
Christopher B., the family court found a battered mother guilty 
of neglect for not being cognizant of the impact her batterer’s 
substance abuse had on her children.126 These cases serve as 
examples of the disparate treatment that may occur when neglect 
allegations arise in the context of neglect proceedings initiated 
by CPS versus those that arise in private divorce actions.127 
In addition, fathers may be pardoned for situations that 
would ordinarily result in neglect proceedings against mothers. 
Professor Jane Murphy, of the University Of Baltimore School 
Of Law, argues that because mothers are more likely to be the 
primary caretakers of children, they are more likely than fathers 
to be indicated in child neglect reports.128 This is partly due to 
                                                          
122 Id. at *13. 
123 Id. at *11. 
124 See generally J.R. v. N.R., No. V-00064/08-08A, 2011 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 2383 (Sup. Ct. May 18, 2011). 
125 In re David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894, 901 (App. Div. 2010); see 
supra Introduction. 
126 In re Christopher B., 809 N.Y.S.2d 202, 202 (App. Div. 2006); see 
infra Part IV. 
       127 See ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 26–27. 
128 Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions 
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mothers’ increased visibility to schools, doctors, and others 
likely to report abuse, and the expectation that even if the father 
is the perpetrator, the mother should have done something to 
protect her child.129 Fathers, on the other hand, are not expected 
to be the primary caretakers of their children, and thus the 
quality of their parenting does not face as much scrutiny.130 
For example, in C.S. v. J.S., the husband brought a private 
divorce action against his wife in the Nassau County Supreme 
Court, on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment.131 He 
alleged that when his wife became pregnant for the second time, 
she began to engage in a pattern of physical, verbal, and 
psychological abuse against him, which caused him to feel 
frightened and humiliated.132 In addition, he alleged that his wife 
grabbed their oldest child by the neck, pinning her against the 
wall, and slapped their youngest child in the face, in his 
presence, causing him to feel “helpless [and] afraid.”133 After 
petitioning for an order of protection, child protective services 
filed neglect petitions on behalf of the children against their 
mother.134  
Although the husband in C.S. admitted that he had witnessed 
his wife use physical violence against their children and that he 
had felt powerless to intervene, he does not appear to have been 
indicated for neglect.135 By contrast, in Green v. Mattingly, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York largely dismissed the claims brought by a battered mother 
that her and her son’s constitutional rights were violated when 
                                                          
From Welfare “Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
688, 708 (1998).  
129 Id. at 718; see also Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A 
Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 285–97 
(discussing this phenomenon and the gender stereotypes which perpetuate it). 
130 See Murphy, supra note 128 at 708; see also Fugate, supra note 129 
at 287–300. 
131 C.S. v. J.S., 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2697, at *1 (Sup. Ct. June 4, 
2009). 
132 Id. at *2–3. 
133 Id. at *5–6. 
134 Id. at *6–7. 
135 See id. at *1, *7. 
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her son was placed in foster care for four days without her 
consent.136 In chronicling the family court case that served as the 
basis for the lawsuit, the court detailed how Ms. Green was 
charged with neglect because her husband had slapped their 
seven-month-old child in the face.137 Ms. Green was living in a 
homeless shelter at the time of the incident, and immediately 
notified the authorities upon learning of her husband’s actions.138 
Despite the fact that her son was returned to her care after four 
days, Ms. Green remained under CPS supervision for more than 
one year while the neglect case against her remained open.139  
There are many reasons why cases like J.R. and C.S. are 
distinguishable from a CPS case, but if the previously mentioned 
cases are any indication, the mother in J.R. and the father in 
C.S. may very well have had their children removed from their 
care if they had entered the family court through a CPS 
investigation. In both cases, the nonviolent parents were victims 
of domestic violence who knew that their partners were 
physically abusing their children and yet did not immediately 
contact the authorities.140 These cases are examples of situations 
in which more affluent parents were not charged with neglect, 
although neglect charges may have been filed against lower-
income families.  
C. Persistent Issues in CPS Treatment of Domestic Violence 
Cases 
Nicholson was an important first step for New York family 
courts and child welfare agencies to move away from a system 
                                                          
136 Green v. Mattingly, No. 07-CV-1790 (ENV) (CLP), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 99864 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010); see also infra Part IV. 
137 Mattingly, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99864, at *8; see also infra Part 
IV. 
138 Mattingly, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99864, at *8; see also infra Part 
IV. 
139 Mattingly, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99864, at *14–15; see also Part 
IV. 
140 See generally J.R. v. N.R., No. V-00064/08-08A, 2011 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 2383 (Sup. Ct. May 18, 2011); see also generally C.S. v. J.S., 2009 
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2697 (Sup. Ct. Jun. 4, 2009). 
660 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
that labeled victims of domestic violence neglectful simply 
because they were abused in front of their children.141 Yet, the 
same problems of hasty removal by overburdened caseworkers 
that existed before Nicholson continue to be at issue today. 
These problems are particularly apparent in cases where failure 
to protect is a primary focus of a neglect case against a battered 
mother.  
1. The Crucial Role Played by CPS Caseworkers and the Need 
for More Stringent Qualifications 
Caseworkers have vast discretion in determining whether a 
child should be removed from his or her primary caretaker for 
neglect.142 Unlike child abuse, which can be substantiated by 
physical evidence, the perceived potential for harm is enough to 
commence neglect proceedings.143 Initially, it is entirely up to the 
investigating caseworker to determine whether such potential for 
harm exists.144 In certain situations, the caseworker can even 
remove the child from his or her home prior to obtaining a court 
order.145 Under these conditions, there is a very real danger that 
caseworkers will impose their subjective values of appropriate 
child rearing on the families they investigate.146  
Yet, many caseworkers are not particularly qualified to make 
these sensitive judgment calls.147 For example, in New York City, a 
CPS caseworker need only have a bachelor’s degree with twenty-
                                                          
141 See supra Part II. 
142 See ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 55; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. 
& REGS. tit. 18, § 432 (2012); see also supra Part II (detailing the path of 
child abuse and neglect cases in New York).  
143 See N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 1012(f)(i) (McKinney 2009) (defining 
a neglected child as one “whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has 
been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); see also ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 55.  
144 ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 55. 
145 JUD. CT. ACTS § 1022; see also, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. 
Supp. 2d 153, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 55 
(suggesting that this exception is widely abused by caseworkers). 
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 ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 56. 
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four credits in “any combination of . . . social work, psychology, 
sociology, human services, criminal justice, education . . . nursing, 
or cultural anthropology.”148 Worker burnout and high turnover 
rates are commonplace in child welfare agencies, and as such many 
caseworkers are inexperienced recent college graduates.149 
Moreover, overburdened caseworkers are incentivized to 
place children in foster care to avoid being held responsible for 
abuse that occurs after they have taken action to “protect” the 
child.150 Dorothy Roberts, a renowned expert on issues of race, 
gender, and the law, argues that “[r]isk-averse authorities are 
more afraid of making the wrong decision to return a child to an 
abusive home than of making the wrong decision to keep a child 
in state custody.”151 For example, while a caseworker that does 
not remove a child may be vulnerable to disciplinary sanction if 
the child is later discovered to be abused, caseworkers are rarely 
blamed for harm inflicted on children in foster care.152  
2. The Detrimental Effects of Removing Children Exposed to 
Domestic Violence  
Foster care is not necessarily a better alternative for children 
deemed to be abused or neglected.153 The act of removal in and 
of itself is particularly traumatic, even under the best of 
circumstances.154 Dorothy Roberts argues that removing a child 
from his or her parents is not only one of the most severe 
governmental intrusions into a parent’s life, but is also an 
                                                          
148 N.Y.C ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., BECOME A CHILD 
PROTECTIVE SPECIALIST (2011), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/ 
html/about/work_cps.shtml. 
149 ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 56. 
150 Id. at 122–23. 
151 Id. at 122. 
152 Id. at 123. 
153 See id. at 223 (detailing how the foster care system is in a current 
state of crisis). 
154 Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Services 
Caseload: Developing an Appropriate Response, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
107, 118 (2002) [hereinafter Stark, Battered Mother]. 
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extremely frightening experience for a child.155 Children in foster 
care are often moved to multiple homes, which can negatively 
impact their sense of security, independence, and self-esteem.156 
Common reactions to removal include feelings of abandonment 
and helplessness.157 To compensate for this lack of control, 
children may blame themselves for the separation in an effort to 
feel that they are still an important part of their parents’ lives or 
to avoid feeling angry with their parents.158 In addition, 
separated children are often fearful that they will be retaliated 
against, because they believe that removal is their fault and that 
they must be punished for it.159  
For children exposed to domestic violence, “where the bond 
to the primary caretaker has already been made fragile by abuse, 
the trauma of placement can be particularly harsh, evoking 
powerful feelings of guilt and self-loathing that can leave lasting 
scars.”160 Children that have been exposed to domestic violence 
“often experience their immediate universe as unpredictable and 
unstable.”161 Children may also perceive their removal as a 
punishment.162 They may experience anxiety concerning the 
battered parent’s safety and guilt that their absence has left them 
unprotected.163 Thus, the negative effects removal has on a child 
must be considered along with the dangers of child maltreatment.164 
Removing these children from their nonviolent parents often re-
victimizes them; in addition to the trauma inflicted on them by 
                                                          
155 ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 17. 
156 Id. at 239. 
157 NER LITTNER, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, SOME 
TRAUMATIC EFFECTS OF SEPARATION AND PLACEMENT 8 (1973).  
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159 Id. at 9. 
160 Stark, Battered Mother, supra note 154, at 118. 
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their abusive parent, they are now thrust against their will into an 
unfamiliar situation that may not even be a safer alternative.165  
IV. COURT DECISIONS AFTER NICHOLSON SUGGEST 
THAT ITS VISION HAS YET TO BE REALIZED 
A review of neglect proceedings brought by CPS against 
battered mothers suggests that while CPS and New York family 
courts may technically be complying with the mandate of 
Nicholson, they have not fully embraced its underlying spirit.166 
Although CPS may no longer bring neglect proceedings against 
a battered mother solely because she is a victim of domestic 
violence, there have been a number of post-Nicholson cases in 
which, despite the inclusion of various relatively minor 
allegations, the mother’s victimization appears to have been the 
primary charge.167 In addition, family courts continue neglect 
proceedings against battered mothers in cases where CPS fails to 
either meet the requisite “imminent risk” standard necessary for 
removal, or to provide an alternative ground for suspecting the 
mother of neglect.168 Usually, the mother is ordered to 
participate in domestic violence services, pending a final order 
of disposition, which may not happen for a significant amount of 
time.169 The following court decisions suggest that Nicholson’s 
vision has yet to fully be realized in New York family courts.170  
David G. is an example of this phenomenon. In that case, 
the judge admonished CPS for violating Nicholson by conducting 
a removal from a victim of domestic violence.171 The court found 
that neither mere speculation that the mother might return to her 
batterer, nor the father’s violation of the order of protection 
were sufficient to establish that imminent risk was present, 
                                                          
165 The “Failure to Protect” Working Grp., supra note 49, at 856; see 
also D’Ambrosio, supra note 164, at 660.  
166 See infra Part IV. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 See, e.g., In re David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d 891, 901 (Fam. Ct. 2010); 
see also Mandel, supra note 162, at 1145; supra Part IV. 
170 See infra Part IV. 
171 David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d at 901. 
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warranting removal.172 Yet, the court did not articulate its 
reasoning for keeping the neglect proceeding open and 
conditioning the mother’s parental custody on her compliance 
with domestic violence services.173 While the court could have 
relied on the allegation that the children were not consistently 
attending school, the court did not articulate this.174 Moreover, 
every condition that the mother was ordered to comply with 
related to her victimization, despite the court having found that 
CPS violated Nicholson by removing the child solely because he 
was exposed to domestic violence.175 For example, the mother 
was not ordered to attend any parenting classes to teach her 
about the importance of sending her children to school.176 Thus, 
the primary focus of the neglect proceeding appears to have 
been the children’s exposure to domestic violence: the exact 
scenario prohibited by Nicholson.177 
Similarly, in In re Aiden L. a battered mother was found to 
have neglected her child by “allowing him to be exposed to an 
incident involving domestic violence” where the father 
ransacked the mother’s home looking for money he believed she 
had stolen from him.178 As additional evidence of the mother’s 
alleged neglect, CPS also blamed the mother for the unclean 
condition of her apartment.179 The court did not find the 
mother’s testimony that the apartment’s condition was temporary 
and due to the father’s rampage to be credible.180 While the 
unsanitary condition of the apartment may certainly have been a 
valid ground on which to find the mother neglectful, the court 
                                                          
172 Id. at 898–99. 
173 Id. at 898–900. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 901. 
176 See id. (enumerating a number of domestic violence related conditions 
for return of the children, but none addressing the mother’s parenting). 
177 Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. 2004). 
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fails to articulate any understanding of the possible connection 
between the domestic violence and the dirty apartment.181 For 
example, there is no mention in the opinion of whether the 
mother was unable to clean the apartment because her primary 
focus was on keeping her child and herself safe from the father’s 
abuse.182 Moreover, while the court faults the mother for 
allowing the father to have contact with the child, its opinion 
does not include any analysis of whether the mother reasonably 
could have concluded that this was a safer course of action for 
her child than refusing to allow the father into their home.183 Of 
course, it is entirely plausible that even after conducting this 
more detailed analysis the mother may still have been found 
neglectful. Yet, in order to further Nicholson’s goal of 
protecting battered mothers from being blamed for their abuse, it 
is crucial that the court articulate its consideration of the 
Nicholson factors when determining whether a battered mother 
has acted reasonably under the circumstances.184 
In re Aiden L. shows that the New York courts have not yet 
embraced the full vision of Nicholson.185 In re Christopher B. is 
another case that indicates that the underlying spirit of Nicholson has 
yet to be realized. In Christopher B., the court found a battered 
mother guilty of neglect because “the child was exposed to regular 
domestic violence and regular drug use by the father.”186 In addition, 
the court determined that the mother had no awareness of the impact 
of the father’s actions on her child.187 Yet, the court did not elaborate 
on the mother’s lack of “awareness”188 and did not consider the 
possibility that the father’s drug use may have either contributed to 
                                                          
181 Id. 
182 See generally Aiden L., 850 N.Y.S.2d 671; see also Copps, supra 
note 178, at 515. 
183 See generally Aiden L., 850 N.Y.S.2d 671. 
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185 See supra Part IV. 
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or have been an integral part of his physical abuse.189 The court may 
very well have been correct in its conclusion that the mother was 
ignorant of the impact of the father’s substance abuse on the child 
and that this made her a neglectful parent. However, the opinion 
was too conclusory, ignoring the analysis that Nicholson requires. 
Nicholson demands that the court specifically identify why it found 
the mother’s alleged lack of awareness to be enough to qualify as 
neglect, in order to ensure that she is not being charged with neglect 
solely based on her batterer’s actions.190  
Green v. Mattingly offers further evidence that New York 
courts fail to realize Nicholson’s vision by continuing neglect 
proceedings against battered mothers.191 In this case, a battered 
mother’s seven-month-old son, T.C., was removed from her 
care because her husband had slapped him in the face, despite 
the fact that the mother immediately reported his actions to the 
authorities.192 CPS initiated child neglect proceedings against 
both Ms. Green and her husband, alleging that Ms. Green was 
aware that her husband had hit their child in the past and that 
she had willfully not complied with an existing order of 
protection by living with her husband.193 Based on these claims, 
T.C. was removed from his mother’s home and placed in foster 
care.194 Ms. Green filed an application pursuant to Family Court 
Act section 1028 for an order returning T.C. to her custody.195 
After four days in foster care, Family Court ordered that T.C. 
be returned to his mother immediately, but the neglect 
proceedings against her remained open for over one year.196  
Since the facts in Green are distinguishable from those in 
Nicholson, the Green court was able to avoid Nicholson’s 
important precedent. In Nicholson, the children had merely been 
                                                          
189 See WALKER, supra note 73, at 53 (“Alcohol and drug abuse are other 
high risk factors for potential lethality.”). 
190 Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 845–46 (N.Y. 2004). 
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exposed to domestic violence but had not been physically abused 
themselves.197 In contrast, the husband in Green had slapped the 
child in the face, and there was evidence that he had spanked 
him in the past.198 Clearly, there is a difference between a child 
who has only been exposed to domestic violence and one who 
has actually been physically abused. Yet, in a case such as this, 
where the abusive partner is the only parent accused of violence 
and the mother immediately notified the authorities upon 
learning of her husband’s actions, an analysis of the Nicholson 
factors would help to shed light on why the family court found 
that the mother had failed to act as “a reasonable and prudent 
parent” would under the circumstances.199 For example, it is 
possible that Ms. Green thought it would be safer for her and 
T.C. if she allowed her husband to live with them than if she 
reported him to the police, which might only enrage him.200 It is 
vital that New York courts clearly delineate their consideration 
of the Nicholson factors in order to further Nicholson’s policy of 
not blaming victims of domestic violence for their abuse. 
Similarly, while a battered mother’s reluctance to leave an 
abusive relationship may be legitimate grounds for finding her 
neglectful, compliance with Nicholson requires that courts delve 
beneath the surface in analyzing the mother’s reasons for not 
wanting her batterer to leave her home. In In re Angelique L., a 
battered mother was found guilty of neglect after a CPS 
caseworker discovered that her live-in boyfriend hit her in front 
of her children.201 The caseworker filed a neglect petition against 
the mother based on her alleged failure to protect her children 
from exposure to repeated incidents of domestic violence, and 
the children’s report to the caseworker that their mother’s 
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boyfriend had hit them in the past.202 The court distinguished this 
case from Nicholson because here the boyfriend had also hit the 
children, and the children were considered to be “extremely 
vulnerable.”203  
While Nicholson dictates that the children’s “special 
vulnerabilities” are a proper consideration for courts in 
determining neglect cases, Nicholson also requires the court to 
consider additional factors in determining the imminent risk to 
the child of remaining in the home versus the potential harm of 
removal.204 For example, in Angelique L., while the court briefly 
mentions that the mother did not wish to press criminal charges 
against her boyfriend and did not want him to leave the home 
because she depended on him for financial support, it does not 
integrate this into its analysis of whether the mother failed to 
exercise a minimal level of care towards her child.205 However, 
Nicholson demands that courts undertake this type of analysis in 
determining whether the mother’s psychological state has been 
so negatively impacted by the abuse that she cannot be trusted to 
properly care for her child, or whether providing her with 
practical services to help her become self-sufficient could 
alleviate the problem.206 
These cases serve as examples of the ways in which CPS 
continues to punish battered mothers for being victims of 
domestic violence, while technically staying within the 
parameters of Nicholson. Therefore, when exposure to domestic 
violence is the primary charge levied against a battered mother 
in a neglect proceeding, it is imperative that the family courts 
carefully examine the basis for the supplemental allegation, so as 
to avoid unfairly blaming victims of domestic violence for their 
batterers’ actions. 
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE 
The Nicholson case was a significant beginning in the 
evolution of the child welfare system’s response to families 
affected by domestic violence; CPS may no longer charge 
battered mothers with neglect solely because they were abused in 
front of their children.207 However, more than mere compliance 
with the literal command of Nicholson is required to bring about 
real change. To fully achieve the policy vision of Nicholson, 
both CPS and the family courts must fully embrace its goal of 
ensuring that the system does not blame battered mothers merely 
for being victims. In addition, more funding must be dedicated 
to providing emergency housing to domestic violence victims so 
that every abused woman who makes the life changing decision 
to leave an abusive relationship has somewhere safe she can 
go.208  
When the primary reason for keeping a neglect proceeding 
against a nonviolent parent open is that her children have been 
exposed to domestic violence, CPS must prove that the child’s 
life or health is at imminent risk warranting removal from the 
battered mother’s care.209 Absent this showing, CPS must 
articulate a separate, credible ground for suspecting impairment 
or risk of impairment to the child.210 If CPS fails to meet this 
burden, family courts should not hesitate to dismiss these neglect 
proceedings in their entirety.211 Ordering battered women to 
comply with domestic violence services within the punitive 
context of neglect proceedings and to enforce orders of 
protection against their batterers under threat of losing their 
children is not the proper way to address the needs of domestic 
violence victims.212 
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A. CPS- and Family Court-Based Solutions 
Family courts fail battered women when they continue, post-
Nicholson, to hold them responsible for domestic violence. In 
cases where CPS does not meet its burden of proving imminent 
risk to the child, courts may still keep proceedings open 
although they cannot articulate a separate ground for suspecting 
neglect.213 This practice furthers CPS’s misguided response to 
the Nicholson holding.214 For example, family courts typically 
order battered mothers charged with neglect to comply with CPS 
referrals for domestic violence shelters, leave their abusers, and 
obtain domestic violence counseling.215 While such orders may 
be intended to ensure the safety of the mother and her child, 
Professor Justine Dunlap argues that charging battered women 
with neglect “re-victimizes the mother by removing her children 
and premising their return on her conformity with governmental 
edict.”216 In reality, these orders are more punishing than 
supportive because the battered mother is at risk of losing her 
children if she does not comply.217 
In addition, maintaining a neglect proceeding against a 
battered mother may reinforce the power and control dynamic 
which is typical in abusive relationships.218 Despite having left 
her batterer, the family court steps in and reinforces the 
batterer’s control over the mother.219 The judge generally orders 
her to comply with CPS supervision, including referrals for 
domestic violence shelters, as well as announced and 
unannounced visits to her home.220 In addition, she will usually 
be ordered to enforce an order of protection against her abuser, 
who may prevent her from calling the police or threaten to hurt 
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her children if she reports his violation.221 She may even be 
charged with neglect if her batterer’s violation of the order of 
protection is the cause of her noncompliance with the court 
order.222  
While family courts may have the best of intentions in 
issuing these orders, they are nonetheless determined on the 
basis of the woman’s status as a victim of domestic violence.223 
If the woman does not comply with these orders, she may lose 
custody of her children.224  
In this way, survivors of domestic violence are blamed for 
the abuse they have suffered.225 Instead, CPS caseworkers should 
be responsible for obtaining and enforcing orders of protection, 
rather than battered women.226 Batterers would presumably be 
more obedient to orders of protection likely to be enforced by 
CPS, as opposed to orders obtained by women who may be too 
frightened to report their abusers’ violations to the police.227 
Furthermore, this practice would send a strong message to 
batterers that they are solely responsible for their actions and 
that domestic violence will not be tolerated.228 
In addition, collaboration between domestic violence 
advocates and CPS is crucial to adequately training CPS 
caseworkers to respond to families affected by domestic 
violence.229 Children’s welfare does not exist separate and apart 
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from the welfare of their parents.230 The child’s welfare is linked 
to the safety of his or her mother, just as in many ways, the 
mother’s well being depends on the safety of her child.231 
Therefore, fostering improved communication between domestic 
violence advocates and child protection workers is a crucial step 
towards decreasing the number of child neglect cases that are 
unnecessarily brought against battered mothers, while ensuring 
the holistic support of the entire family.232  
B. Increased Emergency Housing Options  
In addition, the availability of domestic violence shelters is 
indispensable in helping victims of domestic violence 
successfully escape their abusive relationships.233 Not only do 
these shelters provide battered women with safe and confidential 
housing, but they offer vital services such as counseling, legal 
advocacy, and job training to their residents.234 Instead of simply 
providing temporary housing to battered women, domestic 
violence shelters are intended to provide them with the tools 
they need to achieve independence.235 This is critical because 
battered women often face a catch-22 problem due to their 
common economic dependence and social isolation.236 If they 
leave, they will have nowhere to go and no way to support their 
children.237 If they stay, they will be subject to continued 
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abuse.238 Thus, emergency housing is significant in helping 
domestic violence victims leave abusive relationships.239 
Unfortunately, there is a dire lack of emergency housing 
options in New York. Many women are turned away from 
domestic violence shelters that are at their maximum resident 
capacity.240 In New York City, if there is no space at domestic 
violence shelters, victims are referred to the Prevention 
Assistance and Temporary Housing (“PATH”) office, which will 
assign them to a regular homeless shelter.241 Prior to December 
2009, the New York City Housing Authority’s (“NYCHA”) 
Section 8 program enabled victims of domestic violence to obtain 
rental assistance vouchers.242 However, due to federal budget cuts, 
NYCHA has stopped accepting new applications to this 
program.243 Furthermore, over 3,000 previously issued vouchers 
were revoked.244 Thus, even if a woman enters a domestic 
violence shelter, she will likely face an uphill battle when she 
must eventually secure permanent housing.245  
If the child welfare system expects battered mothers to 
successfully leave their abusive partners, it is imperative that the 
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resources necessary to accomplish this are available to them. 
Victims of domestic violence should not have to choose between 
staying with their batterers and becoming homeless.246 Therefore, 
more government funding must be directed to providing 
emergency housing to survivors of domestic violence in order to 
facilitate their safe transition into self-sufficiency. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Nicholson was an important first step in the child welfare 
system’s recognition that nonviolent battered mothers should not 
be charged with neglect solely because their children have been 
exposed to domestic violence.247 True change, however, requires 
more than technical compliance with Nicholson’s holding. To 
fully embrace the underlying spirit of Nicholson, family courts 
must consistently reinforce the Nicholson holding by undergoing 
a comprehensive analysis of battered mothers’ behavior in 
determining whether they should be deemed neglectful.248 
In addition, CPS caseworkers must receive proper training in 
how to skillfully respond to families affected by domestic 
violence.249 In order to be effective, this training should 
encompass the complex interpersonal dynamics of an abusive 
relationship and emphasize that the psychological effects of 
domestic violence are often temporary and may be rectified in 
many cases by removing batterers from the home via an order of 
protection.250 Furthermore, there must be sufficient community 
support for domestic violence survivors who make the difficult 
decision to leave an abusive relationship.251 Increased funding to 
organizations and government resources providing domestic 
violence shelters and permanent housing to survivors is crucial 
in ensuring the safety of battered mothers and their children.252 
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In this way, New York child welfare agencies and family courts 
will be able to truly hold batterers accountable for their actions 
and support families affected by domestic violence in their quest 
towards safety and independence. 
 
